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The hard problem of consciousness has been often claimed to be unsolvable by the
methods of traditional empirical sciences. It has been argued that all the objects of
empirical sciences can be fully analyzed in structural terms but that consciousness is
(or has) something over and above its structure. However, modern neuroscience has
introduced a theoretical framework in which also the apparently non-structural aspects
of consciousness, namely the so called qualia or qualitative properties, can be analyzed in
structural terms. That framework allows us to see qualia as something compositional with
internal structures that fully determine their qualitative nature. Moreover, those internal
structures can be identiﬁed which certain neural patterns. Thus consciousness as a whole
can be seen as a complex neural pattern that misperceives some of its own highly complex
structural properties as monadic and qualitative. Such neural pattern is analyzable in fully
structural terms and thereby the hard problem is solved.
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INTRODUCTION: THE HARD PROBLEM AS A TENSION
BETWEEN THREE THESES
One possible way to present the hard problem of consciousness is
to consider three seemingly plausible theses that are in an inter-
esting tension. First, all the objects of physics and other natural
sciences can be fully analyzed in terms of structure and relations,
or simply, in structural terms. Second, consciousness is (or has)
something over and above its structure and relations. Third, the
existence and nature of consciousness can be explained in terms
of natural sciences. Should the second thesis be incorrect and con-
sciousness fully analyzable in structural terms, then ﬁnding the
structure of consciousness in some patterns of neural activity (or
perhaps in some linguistic-behavioral patterns) and studying the
origin and nature of that structure would hopefully reveal us even-
tually all there is to know about consciousness. On the other hand,
if both the ﬁrst and the second theses are true, it follows directly
that consciousness cannot be an object of physics or other natu-
ral (or behavioral) sciences and hence its existence cannot be also
explained by these sciences.
David Chalmers, the author of the hard problem of conscious-
ness, accepts both the ﬁrst and the second theses and draws also the
conclusion mentioned above. He also adds the premise that what
cannot be physically explained is not itself physical (Chalmers,
2003). Therefore he is convinced that the only solution to the hard
problem is to endorse some sort of ontological dualism, most
preferably a form of property dualism. He argues that traditional
natural sciences (for example neuroscience and cognitive science)
can perhaps one day explain all the structural-relational proper-
ties of consciousness (for example in terms of neural, functional or
informational structures and relations), but that consciousness has
besides these also phenomenal properties that are in principle out
of the reach of traditional scientiﬁc methods. However, a number
of philosophers have argued that all forms of ontological dualism
are philosophically highly problematic, and basically everyone
agrees that it would be desirable, if possible, to ﬁnd a solution
to the hard problem without endorsing any form of ontological
dualism.
I will argue that the threat of dualism can be avoided and the
hard problem can be solved by accepting the ﬁrst and the third
theses while rejecting the second one. In other words, I will argue
that the objects of physics and other natural sciences can be indeed
fully analyzed in structural terms, but that so can be consciousness.
More speciﬁcally, I will suggest that the apparently non-structural
and monadic elements of consciousness, namely the qualia, are in
fact compositional and have an internal structure. According to
my proposal, which is based mainly on the work of Francis Crick
and Christof Koch (Crick and Koch, 1998; Koch, 2004), the com-
ponents of qualia are unconscious associations and the structures
of qualia are the structures of networks of these unconscious asso-
ciations. I will argue that those structures can be also described
in neural terms and thereby identiﬁed with certain neural pat-
terns. Shortly, according to my view, qualia can be analyzed in
fully structural terms and identiﬁed with certain neural patterns.
Since the formulation of the hard problem I am using (the
formulation, according to which it is the tension between the three
above presented theses) is not a typical one, perhaps a few words
should be said about it before proceeding.
There are two main reasons for me to favor the above pre-
sented formulation: the ﬁrst one is rhetorical and the second is
strategic. The rhetorical reason is the following: the formulation I
have chosen summarizes nicely some central ideas about the hard-
ness of the hard problem. Namely, most presentations of the hard
problem include the idea according to which all the so called easy
problems of consciousness are “easy” because they are problems
of explaining some functions of consciousness. The hard problem
is, accordingly, a problem of the existence of certain properties
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or aspects of consciousness which cannot be analyzed in terms
of functions. Similarly, Chalmers (2003) rejects physicalism on
the grounds that every physical phenomenon can be analyzed
in terms of structure and dynamics, but that consciousness has
certain properties or aspects which cannot be analyzed in such
terms. It has been also argued that empirical methods have access
only to dispositional properties, but that consciousness has besides
those also properties that cannot be analyzed in terms of dispo-
sitions. The list of similar arguments could be continued. What
is common in all of them is the idea that every object of natu-
ral sciences can be analyzed in terms of some structures (causal,
dispositional, functional, spatiotemporal, relational, informa-
tional, etc.), but that certain properties or aspects of consciousness
cannot.
I am aware that a position according to which every object of
natural sciences can be analyzed in terms of some speciﬁc type
of structures is strictly speaking not the same one as the position
according to which every object of natural sciences can be ana-
lyzed in structural terms tout court. I am also aware that the ideas
described above are typically used as parts of the arguments against
physicalism and not as formulations of the hard problem itself. If
someone wants to reject my formulation on those grounds, she is
welcomed to do so. For my purposes it is actually enough to rec-
ognize the problem I have formulated as a philosophical problem
that is related to the hard problem in a simple and straightforward
way which I will specify below.
The most common ways to introduce the hard problem are
intuitively appealing but rather obscure in meaning. So, the hard
problem is typically introduced as the problem of explaining how
the conscious experience“rises”fromneural activity orwhy is there
something“it is like to be” conscious. An important phase in every
careful presentation of the hard problem is therefore specifying
the meanings of the obscure expressions used in those intu-
itively appealing introductions. While talking about unique and
philosophically signiﬁcant features of conscious states Chalmers
(2003, p. 103) writes: “Each of these [conscious] states has a
phenomenal character, with phenomenal properties (or qualia)
characterizing what it is like to be in the state.” Then he spec-
iﬁes the meaning of “qualia” in a following endnote (p. 135):
“On my usage, qualia are simply those properties that charac-
terize conscious states according to what it is like to have them.”
So, in the context of the hard problem, qualia or phenomenal
properties are exactly those properties or aspects of conscious-
ness whose existence seems to be inexplicable in the framework
of traditional natural sciences. Therefore, the most generally
put, the essence of the hard problem is that some properties
or aspects of consciousness (however we decide to call them)
appear to be inexplicable in the framework of traditional natural
sciences.
Now I am ready to state my strategic reason for using the
formulation presented above: by formulating the hard problem
as a tension between the three theses presented above and then
approaching it by using the strategy mentioned earlier (arguing
that the objects of physics and other natural sciences can be indeed
fully analyzed in terms of structure and relations, but that so can
be consciousness) I hope to demonstrate that there are no such
properties or aspects of consciousness that cannot be explained in
the framework of traditional natural sciences. Therefore I will pro-
ceed, for the sake of simplicity, as if my formulation is a legitimate
formulation of the hard problem. Anybody who feels that it is in
fact not, can consider it as a formulation of a separate problem
which is related to the hard problem in the following straightfor-
ward way: solving the problem I have formulated by using the
strategy I am using solves also the hard problem. And this is all
that should matter at the end of the day.
To sum up, my strategy is based on a simple idea, a con-
ditional, which I believe to be undeniable: If a phenomenon is
analyzable in fully structural terms, then explaining the origin and
nature of the structure of that phenomenon amounts to explain-
ing the origin and nature of the phenomenon itself. I will argue
that we have a good reason to believe that consciousness is in
fact analyzable in fully structural terms and that contemporary
neuroscience can offer us a partly speculative, but nevertheless
plausible idea about the nature and origin of that structural
phenomenon.
SCIENTIFIC OBJECT STRUCTURALISM
Before proceeding to the most important part of my argument,
which is the rejection of the second thesis by offering a fully
structural account of consciousness, I will consider brieﬂy why
we should accept the ﬁrst thesis. Firstly, the position that stresses
the structural nature of objects of natural sciences is very widely
accepted. Let us call it scientiﬁc object structuralism. It is held
by Lockwood (1989), Strawson (2006), Stoljar (2001), Mermin
(1998), Eddington (1928),Chalmers (1996), Russell (1927), Seager
(2006), Shoemaker (1994), Ladyman and Ross (2007), to mention
only few. Among numerous supporters of very different forms of
scientiﬁc object structuralism there are both defenders and critics
of ontological dualism, and moreover, even though the position is
often presented in the context of philosophy of mind (for example
Russell, 1927; Chalmers, 1996; Seager, 2006), it has been also fre-
quently put forward in a much broader contexts of philosophy of
science andmetaphysics (for example Shoemaker, 1994; Ladyman
and Ross, 2007).
Put informally, the main idea of scientiﬁc object structuralism
is that every piece of relata in whichever network of relations stud-
ied by natural sciences can be analyzed further in relational terms.
Also, almost every element of whichever structure can be arguably
analyzed in terms of some ﬁner-grain structure. And supposing
there are some fundamental elements with no ﬁner-grain inter-
nal structure, it would be still arguably true that these elements
are empirically accessible only via their (causal) relations with
other elements and objects (including, perhaps, some measuring
apparatus). In other words, all our knowledge about them is lim-
ited to the relations they have with other objects (and eventually
to us).
However, only a relatively small minority of the proponents
of scientiﬁc object structuralism believe that structure and rela-
tions are actually all there is. An example of that kind of radical
structuralist metaphysics is a theory of Ladyman and Ross (2007).
According to their position, knownas ontic structural realism (also
as radical structuralism), pieces of relata and elements of struc-
tures in theories of natural sciences are merely heuristic devices
with no fundamental ontological status. Shoemaker (1994) argues
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in a similar spirit that causal relations and causal structures are the
only thing ontologically fundamental. His position is sometimes
referred to as causal essentialism.
Many scientiﬁc object structuralists defend a less radical posi-
tion, known as epistemic structural realism, according to which
structure and relations are simply all we can empirically access.
Some proponents of epistemic structural realism argue that even
though we cannot have any empirical evidence for the existence of
non-structural fundamental relata, we have to assume their exis-
tence in order tomake sense of the idea of there being any relations
in the ﬁrst place. In other words, they argue that there could be
no relations without some fundamental relata (for example Esfeld,
2004).
Some philosophers defend yet weaker form of scientiﬁc object
structuralism. According to them it is true that traditional sci-
entiﬁc methods have no access to anything but structure and
relations, but that the existence of something over and above struc-
ture and relations can nevertheless be perceived. Namely, they
hold that the existence of our immediate conscious experience is
known to us directly and that we can also“see” that our conscious-
ness is something over and above its structure – it is arguably
something that has a structure, not something that merely is a
structure. From the group of philosophers mentioned above the
proponents of that position are Chalmers (1996), Russell (1927),
Seager (2006).
In addition to the fact that the core idea of scientiﬁc object
structuralism is very widely accepted, it is also hard to see how
rejecting it could help us solve the hard problem of conscious-
ness. The only way I could imagine this to happen, is if someone
demonstrated that at least some of the perfectly ordinary objects
of natural sciences have such irreducibly non-structural proper-
ties whose existence can be experimentally veriﬁed and is also
philosophically unproblematic. Namely, if the existence of such
properties was not experimentally veriﬁed but simply assumed in
result of some philosophical considerations, then those properties
would not be proper objects of natural sciences after all. And if
their existence was philosophically problematic, it would not solve
the hard problem but simply expand it to some other phenom-
ena besides consciousness. And as far as I know, no one has yet
demonstrated that any ordinary objects of natural sciences have
(or could have) such properties.
On the other hand, the idea that consciousness has some fea-
tures over and above its structural and relational properties has
much less supporters and has in fact been strongly criticized by
many (for example bymost of the functionalists, behaviorists, and
representationalists). However, most of the attempts to analyze
consciousness in fully structural terms have ended up eliminating
or simply ignoring certain (qualitative) aspects of consciousness
whose existence is considered as absolutely obvious by many. In
other words, it has been hard to come by with a theory of con-
sciousness that would satisfy both structuralists and qualia realists.
Below I will try to sketch a framework which, I believe, should
appease both parties.
STRUCTURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS AND QUALIA
Proponents of the non-structural view of consciousness have often
suggested that the non-structural elements of consciousness are
the so called qualia – supposedly monadic and qualitative fea-
tures of conscious experience. Qualia are typically considered to
be private to the one experiencing them and ineffable by nature.
The paradigmatic examples of qualia are simple color experi-
ences or raw feels: the redness of red or the painfulness of pain.
So, the typical framework behind the non-structural view about
consciousness would look something like this: Substantial build-
ing blocks of consciousness, namely the qualia, are connected
by numerous complex relations and forming numerous com-
plex structures. An individual consciousness as a whole would
be hence some kind of structured bundle of qualia. Arguably,
the structure of such bundle could in principle turn out to
be identical with a structure of a certain pattern of neural
activity, which would be in principle accessible by methods of
future neuroscience (even Chalmers, 1995, 2003, believes that the
structure of consciousness is identical with some informational
structure in our brains), but the qualitative properties of qualia
could not.
The question of what does it exactly mean that the structure of
consciousness could turn out to be a structure of a neural activ-
ity pattern is obviously a tricky one. An impressive attempt to
answer it is made by Revonsuo (2006). He believes that the struc-
ture of consciousness will be found in the brains once we discover
and learn to monitor the proper level of organization of the neural
activity – in any other level we would ﬁnd only the neural cor-
relates of consciousness (NCC). In other words, in those lower
levels we would ﬁnd some patterns of neural activity that correlate
with the content of our consciousness, but we would not under-
stand why those correlations occur and what their nature is. On
the proper level of organization, on the other hand, we would
ﬁnd a pattern that simply has a structure consciousness. However,
Ladyman and Ross (2007, pp. 53–57) criticize strongly the idea of
there being different ontological levels in nature because, accord-
ing to them, there are plenty of natural phenomena which do
not ﬁt nicely to the framework of hierarchically organized levels.
Nevertheless, they are not denying the obvious fact that struc-
tural patterns in nature are often organized in a semi-hierarchical
manner. Fortunately, the main ideas of Revonsuo (2006) seem
to be easily conveyable from the framework of levels to the more
ﬂexible one allowedbyLadymanandRoss (2007), so that the struc-
ture of consciousness could be seen as a pattern of certain other
patterns of certain yet other patterns etc. of some simple neural
events.
Still, according to the view of Chalmers and others who believe
that qualia are irreducibly qualitative, even if we could get from
mere unexplained correlations between some neural activity pat-
tern and consciousness to the detailed structural identity (or
structural isomorphism) between the two, we could still not estab-
lish full identity between them because qualia would be essentially
non-structural and could not be, therefore, identiﬁed with any
structures. For example, in case of visual consciousness, one could
argue that even if we could one day “see” by scanning someone’s
brain that she has a visual experience of a red apple on a green
plate (and even if we could detect all the structural details of the
perceived scene), we would still (arguably) have no idea why the
redness of the red and the greenness of the green are experiencedby
her the way they are and not, for example, other way around (and
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moreover, why are they experienced in such a vivid and qualitative
fashion at all).
The supposed privacy and ineffability of qualia has made the-
ories about them vulnerable to philosophical arguments based
on the largely supported view that the nature of language and
meaning is essentially public and intersubjective. It has been
often argued in Wittgensteinian or Quinean fashion that the
concept of private object is philosophically highly problematic
because absolutely private objects could have no role in lan-
guage or in any of our theories. Generally, the Wittgensteinian
attitude toward consciousness tends to lead to an externalist
view about the phenomenon: it seems that if all our references
about the content of our consciousness are actually made by
using the vocabulary of extramental public objects, then the
proper theory of consciousness should be a theory about our
linguistic-behavioral interactions with the extramental world (see,
for example, Lagerspetz, 2002). However, there seems to be a
philosophically rather shallow point of view from which it makes
perfect sense to claim that a mental content can be private (but
not private in the philosophically problematic absolute sense):
namely, a neurobiological point of view, fromwhich people can be
seen as biological cognitive systems with limited communicative
skills.
There seems to be no deep philosophical mystery about an idea
of a cognitive system that has certain information about someof its
inner states, but lacks the ability to communicate that information
to others. An excellent example of that kind of neurobiological
description of human beings has been put forward by Crick and
Koch (1998), Koch (2004). Besides explaining the (non-absolute)
privacy of qualia, Crick and Koch also offer an excellent account
of the apparently monadic nature of qualia.
Before proceeding, it should be noticed that even though I
build my case here solely on the theory of Crick and Koch (and
also “ﬁne-tune” my arguments accordingly), the general strategy
I am using is compatible with whichever (neurobiological) fully
structural account of qualia. For instance, there are several the-
ories according to which individual qualia are deﬁned by their
location in the complex multidimensional qualia space (or simply,
by their similarity and dissimilarity relations with other qualia),
for example, Churchland (1986), O’Brien and Opie (1999), Edel-
man (2003), Pestana (2005). Those theories could be, in principle,
interpreted so that the structure of an individual quale is the
structure of the network of all the similarity and dissimilarity
relations the quale has with other qualia. Similarly, according
to Balduzzi and Tononi (2009), each individual quale is a cer-
tain “shape” in a qualia space – a shape that embodies certain set
of informational relationships. So, the structure of such set of
relationships could be seen as a structure of the corresponding
quale.
The main reason why I have chosen to focus on the theory of
Crick and Koch is that I ﬁnd their approach intuitively particularly
appealing, for it allowsus tounderstand thehypothetical structural
nature of an individual quale both in neural and in phenomenal
terms.
Let us consider someone’s conscious experience of the color red.
According to Crick and Koch, the structure of such reddish color
experience (or themeaning of that experience) is a vast network of
unconscious associations of all the countless encounters with red
objects in that person’s personal history and of personal histories
of her ancestors, embodied in her genes (Crick and Koch, 1998;
Koch, 2004, pp. 242–244). The peculiar phrase “embodied in her
genes”means simply that not all the unconscious associations are
formed during a person’s lifetime as a result of her interactionwith
the environment, but that some of them are innate: programmed
by the evolution, so to speak.
Crick and Koch (1998) also manage to give an account of these
associations in terms of neural processes. According to them, there
is an explicit neural representation for every aspect of our conscious
experience. By an explicit neural representation they mean an
increased activity of a “smallish group of neurons” (most likely
between 100 and 1000) situated close together. Those groups of
neurons can be also called essential nodes (Koch, 2004, pp. 34–
35). Every time when the activity of one of such essential nodes is
above certain threshold, a person is conscious of the corresponding
aspect (it could be a color, a shape, a direction of movement, a
familiar object, etc.).
In order to avoid various philosophical problems related to the
difﬁcult concept of neural representation (see, for example, Hutto
and Myin, 2013), those neural events should not be seen as rep-
resentations in themselves in any deeper metaphysical sense. The
fact that the increased activity in certain essential nodes system-
atically co-occurs (in proper conditions) with the typical (verbal)
reactions to certain aspect of consciousness (for example, a subject
reporting of seeing something red) is the only prima facie reason
for us to call the activity of these essential nodes explicit neural
representations. One of the main reasons for such systematic co-
occurrences is, according to the hypothesis, the fact that all the
essential nodes responsible for explicit representations are directly
connected to the planning modules of the brain (the prefrontal
and anterior cingulate cortices, in particular), where their projec-
tions can easily affect the behavior of the subject (Koch, 2004, p.
245).
Therefore, according to the hypothesis, the totality of all the
explicit neural representations has a detailed and exact correla-
tion with the content of the person’s consciousness. Since all the
essential nodes responsible for the explicit neural representations
are (by the hypothesis) also connected to the planning modules
of the brain, it means that the functional structure of the whole
network of the explicit neural representations would actually be
the functional structure of the corresponding consciousness. In
other words, the causal effects of the network described above
are supposedly identical to the causal effects of our consciousness
(that is why we can report most of the aspects of the content of
our consciousness).
However, the question about the nature of qualia remains: why
should the increased activity in an essential node have a speciﬁc,
yet ineffable qualitative feel? According to a somewhat speculative
hypothesis of Crick and Koch, the quale associated to an explicit
neural representation is the meaning of that representation to the
rest of the brain. In psychological and phenomenal terms that
meaning is, as mentioned before, a vast network of various uncon-
scious associations. In neural terms it is the network of all those
neural connections that the essential node in question has with
other essential nodes.
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When the activity of some essential node rises above required
threshold for the corresponding aspect to become a part of con-
sciousness, then the activity of most of the connected essential
nodes rises slightly, but stays below the required threshold. How-
ever, the slightly increased activity of the vast network of all the
connected essential nodes is collectively strong enough to affect
person’s attitude toward the consciously experienced aspect. Then
the person becomes conscious of the corresponding aspect and
its rich and speciﬁc meaning (the quale), but stays ignorant of
the single unconscious associations composing that meaning (the
components and structure of the quale).
In order to understand the situation in phenomenal terms it
would be perhaps better to think of the so called unconscious
associations not as absolutely unconscious, but as vaguely con-
scious (perhaps as a“tip of a tongue”kind of conscious – conscious
without a quale but with an ability to recognize the missing quale
instantly, should it pop up, as “the right one”). So, the slightly
increased activity of any single essential node that corresponds
to some vaguely conscious aspect would be too week to cause
any signiﬁcant activity in the planning modules of the brain,
and therefore the subject could not report any conscious experi-
ence of the corresponding aspect. However, the slightly increased
activity of the vast network of all the connected essential nodes
that corresponds to a quale would be collectively strong enough
to cause some neural activity in the planning modules, and so
the subject could report of experiencing something peculiarly
speciﬁc, but she would not be able to distinguish or recognize
(or report) any single vaguely conscious components of that
experience.
Since different networks of unconscious (or vaguely conscious)
associations would have different inﬂuences on the planningmod-
ules, the person could identify different networks of unconscious
associations without having conscious access to their structures.
That is why these networks would appear to hermonadic and their
differences qualitative (even though they are in fact highly complex
and in principle analyzable in structural terms). Since the person
would have no conscious access to the complex structure of her
qualia, she could not obviously communicate it to the others. So,
in this sense, qualia would be truly private and ineffable to the one
experiencing them.
By analogy, we can consider somemacro-physical properties of
an ordinary physical object made of wood and stone: if we exam-
ine such object at a low enough level of detail, we can call the
macro-physical properties of woody and stony qualitative proper-
ties (here I use the word “qualitative” in a strictly physical sense,
as, for example, wood and stone have different qualities from the
perspective of a construction engineer or an architect). In order to
understand the qualitative difference between woody and stony in
terms of the internal structures of those materials, we would have
to enter some ﬁner-grained level – for example to the one in which
we ﬁnd the structures of single molecules. In case of conscious-
ness we are simply dealing with a cognitive system that is not
capable of examining its own inner structure at the level where
the qualitative properties of qualia are analyzable in structural
terms.
Since the hypothesis presented above contains an idea accord-
ing to which people are ignorant of the fundamental (structural)
nature of their qualia, it has some superﬁcial resemblance to the
so called epistemic view or ignorance hypothesis, put forward by
Stoljar (2006). To avoid confusion, it should be recognized that
the main idea and strategy of Crick and Koch are actually very
different from the one of Stoljar. The main idea of Stoljar is, in
a nutshell, that we are scientiﬁcally ignorant about the nature of
consciousness and that this is why we fail to see how conscious-
ness could be reducible to anything physical (or non-experiential,
as Stoljar puts it). It is clear that the philosophically relevant igno-
rance in the theory of Crick and Koch is not scientiﬁc ignorance,
but an ignorance of individual human beings. The ignorance of
individual human beings is part of their cognitive architecture
and there is no reason why we could not have scientiﬁc knowl-
edge about that architecture. For example, when I have a visual
perception of a red apple, I have a direct epistemic access to many
structural features of my visual experience: the size and shape of
the perceived apple, for instance. I do not have similar direct epis-
temic access to the structure of the perceived redness of my visual
experience, but this does not mean that I could not be a member
of a scientiﬁc community that has scientiﬁc knowledge about that
structure.
Another philosophical view that has deeper and more substan-
tial resemblance to the theory of Crick and Koch is the so called
introspective inaccuracy hypotheses, put forward by Pereboom
(2011). According to Pereboom (2011, p. 14) it is a serious open
possibility that the introspective mode of presentation misrepre-
sents the qualitative nature of qualia (or phenomenal properties).
Pereboom (2011, pp. 16–17) also suggests that the nature of that
misrepresentation could be such that the qualia (or phenomenal
properties) are actually compositional and complex, but appear
in introspection as primitive and monadic. If Crick and Koch are
right, then qualia are indeed compositional and complex, even
though they appear to us as primitive and monadic. Therefore,
if Crick and Koch are right, then the introspective inaccuracy is
in fact much more than just a serious open possibility: it is an
actual matter of fact. Therefore it is interesting that Pereboom
does not mention the work of Crick and Koch or any other neuro-
biological structural account of qualia. I am not going to speculate
why he does not, but I think it is important to notice that even
though the views of Pereboom and Crick and Koch are, as far as
I can tell, fully compatible, the theory of Crick and Koch is much
more experimental and naturalistic in spirit and much less philo-
sophical. On the other hand, since Pereboom offers a detailed
analysis of how the introspective inaccuracy hypotheses would
answer the most important and famous philosophical arguments
related to the hard problem (the so called conceivability argument
and knowledge argument), his treatment might be considered
to add a signiﬁcant philosophical credibility to the hypothesis of
Crick and Koch.
One seemingly substantial difference between the views of Pere-
boom and Crick and Koch is that Pereboom (2011, p. 14) suggests
that phenomenal properties might not actually have any qualita-
tive nature,whileCrick andKoch are explicitly realists about qualia
and their qualitative nature while denying simply that qualia are
fundamentally qualitative. I suspect that the above difference is not
in fact substantial at all, butmerely terminological: Crick andKoch
are realists about the qualitative nature of qualia in the sense that
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one can be realist about macro-physical qualitative properties of
ordinary physical objects, for example the woodiness of wood or
the (physical) redness of a red tomato, while recognizing that such
macro-physical qualitative properties are not in fact fundamental,
but analyzable in fully structural terms in some ﬁner-grained level.
Pereboom, on the other hand, questions the qualitative nature of
phenomenal properties in the sense that one can question the exis-
tence of qualitativemacro-physical properties of ordinary physical
objects on the grounds that these properties are actually not fun-
damentally qualitative, but analyzable in structural terms in some
ﬁner-grained level. So it seems that the two views are actually in
a substantial agreement, but I prefer qualia-realistic terminology
of Crick and Koch for rhetorical reasons: we are so impressed by
the undeniable and vivid presence of the qualia because qualia
do exist and we have an immediate and direct cognitive access to
them, although we do not have an immediate and direct cognitive
access to their internal structures.
To sum up, according to the framework introduced by
Crick and Koch, qualia are highly complex and perfectly public
structural-relational properties of some cognitive systems, even
though those systems themselves perceive them as monadic and
private. The blueness of blue and the redness of red are quali-
tatively different because the structures of the networks of their
composing unconscious associations are different. Similarly, the
quality of a red quale feels exactly theway it does because the struc-
ture of the network of its composing unconscious associations is
exactly such as it is.
Of course, a skepticwouldnot be convinced: so far I have simply
asked the reader to believe that the speciﬁc quality of a quale is a
result of its internal structure, but unless there is a way it could be
somehow phenomenally veriﬁed, we have no compelling reason
to believe so. Therefore I will consider next a situation that could
be, in my opinion, interpreted as having a direct glimpse at the
internal structure of an apparently monadic quale.
Daniel Dennett offers an example of a situation where an
apparently monadic quale is analyzed phenomenally into several
components: the quale of a low guitar sound seems to be monadic
at ﬁrst, but will be perceived as an ensemble of many sounds
after we have isolated and listened the individual overtones that
compose the original sound (Dennett, 1991, pp. 49–50). Dennett,
who is famously known for denying the existence of qualia, uses
the above example to demonstrate how confused we are about
the nature of our sensory perceptions. However, the framework
of Crick and Koch allows us interpreting Dennett’s example as
a situation in which a small part of the unconscious structure
(the overtone structure) of an auditory quale becomes conscious.
What is interesting is that once a person has learned to recog-
nize the individual overtones of the sound, she also, in a sense,
understands why the ensemble of these overtones sounds the way
it does. In other words, most of the people would be, in the situa-
tion described above, intuitively willing to admit that the overtone
structuremore or less determines the guitarish quality of the com-
posed sound: they would still hear the original sound, but not as a
monadic and ineffable quale but as the ensemble of its overtones.
Also, almost everyone would agree that the composed sound is
somehow phenomenally richer than any of its individual over-
tones and that this richness can be perceived as well before as
after one learns to hear the overtones in the composed sound. It
is as if we could somehow perceive that there is a lot of infor-
mation in some apparently monadic quale, but could not tell
what kind of information that is. Once we become aware of the
overtone structure, we get access to some (a tiny part) of that
information.
However, it should be noticed that above exercise would not
allow us to leave the space of qualitative experience, for all the
experienced individual overtones would have qualia of their own.
Nevertheless, the exercise would allow us to see (assuming it has
been fully successful) that the auditory quale, which we used to
believe to be as monadic and ineffable as phenomenal redness,
has actually an internal structure that more or less determines its
speciﬁc phenomenal character.
Of course, it could be wondered if the mere feeling (or an intu-
ition) that the perceived guitarishness is compositional allows us
to conclude that it is actually compositional. Fortunately, in this
particular case the mere feeling (or an intuition) seems to be all
the evidence we need. Namely, the only reason for us to believe
that the phenomenal guitarishness was monadic and not compo-
sitional, was that we felt it was monadic and not compositional.
And once that feeling is removed by the exercise described above,
the corresponding belief should be abandoned as well.
The above example is important, for it helps us understand
intuitively why our qualia have so peculiarly speciﬁc natures. In
other words, it helps us understand why different qualia are not
simply characterized by apparently ineffable “somethingness,” but
have each a very speciﬁc apparently ineffable“suchness.”For exam-
ple, should we train our ear to distinguish between the overtone
structures of the sounds of guitar and trumpet, we would, suppos-
edly, understand intuitively (or “perceive directly”) what are the
structural natures of the qualities like“guitarish”and“trumpetish”
and why each of them has its speciﬁc qualitative “suchness.”
From here we could continue with wilder speculations and
imagine a technique or a device that could help us become con-
scious of some associations that are essential components of our
color qualia. Perhaps such device could locate the essential nodes
that correspond to the most important unconscious associations
of some quale (the ones with the strongest inﬂuence on the
planning modules). After that the device could stimulate those
nodes and turn the corresponding unconscious associations con-
scious. Then, supposedly, we would understand intuitively why
the redness of the red quale and the greenness of the green quale
appear to us the way they do and not the other way around. It
is important to notice that if the theory of Crick and Koch is
approximately true, then the above speculation is not merely a
thought experiment but an empirical prediction – an actual exper-
iment for the future scientists to design. The similar examples
can be put forward about smells, tastes or moods. For exam-
ple, it is traditionally held that certain unconscious memories
of some traumatic events can cause depression or anxiety, but
perhaps the better way to think of the situation would be, in
the light of the theory of Crick and Koch, that those uncon-
scious memories are parts or components of the depression or the
anxiety.
One could still argue that the problem remains, for the con-
sciously experienced components of guitarishness and blueness
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would have qualitative properties of their own. But according to
the hypothesis, (most of) those components would be initially
unconscious and “qualialess” – they would acquire qualia only
at the moment they become conscious (when the activity of the
corresponding essential nodes reaches the threshold and activates
their own networks of unconscious associations). And then, as
predicted by the hypothesis and suggested by Dennett’s example,
a subject would recognize them as components of the original
quale and also realize that she was not conscious of them before.
Nevertheless, because of the enormous structural complexity of
qualia, the subject would never become directly conscious of the
full structure of her quale.
So, the way I see it, the present evidence for the hypothe-
sis according to which qialia are fully structural comes mainly
from neurobiology. But in the future the hypothesis could be
signiﬁcantly strengthened by the evidence fromphenomenal expe-
rience. Namely, the hypothesis predicts that whichever apparently
monadic and non-structural qualewe choose to pick,with the help
of our future device, it would reveal its structural (even though not
fully structural) nature. And thatmakes the hypothesis empirically
falsiﬁable: should we ﬁnd a quale that could not be phenomenally
decomposed by our hypothetical future device, we would have
a concrete evidence against the compositional theory of qualia
presented here.
It is true that the theory of Crick and Koch is partly spec-
ulative and could be wrong in many of its details. However,
their theory gives us a positive and rather speciﬁc idea of
how the existence and nature of qualia could be explained in
structural terms, and hence it offers us a good and scientif-
ically inspired reason to believe that the apparently monadic
and non-structural character of qualia is in fact not fundamen-
tally qualitative and monadic. My main goal is not to use the
hypothesis of Crick and Koch for developing another philosoph-
ical argument for the possibility of structural analysis of qualia,
but to present their neurobiological theory as an actual hypo-
thetical structural description of qualia: a description which is
very coarse and by large part speculative, but which would solve
the hard problem because it could be understood both in neu-
ral and in phenomenal terms. In other words, my aim is to
present the theory of Crick and Koch as a coarse and hypothet-
ical but fully structural description of a natural phenomenon
that would be recognized at the same time as a description of
phenomenal consciousness and a description of certain neu-
ral activity. The description of phenomenal consciousness is
recognized, when the structure is described in terms of uncon-
scious associations and illustrated with examples like the one
borrowed form Dennett. The description of neural activity, on
the other hand, is recognized, when the very same structure
is described in terms of explicit representations and essential
nodes. In other words, according to the hypothesis, the rela-
tional structure of the whole network of the active essential
nodes (both the ones corresponding to aspects of conscious-
ness and the ones corresponding to unconscious associations) is
identical to the relational structure of consciousness (including
qualia).
This is where I would like to rest my case. A fully structural
account (in the sense that it does not contain any irreducibly
non-structural elements) of consciousness and qualia together
with a speculative, but plausible theory of how such structure
is actually (identical to) the structure of a certain neural activ-
ity pattern is, in my understanding, nothing less than a solution
to the hard problem. It answers the question of how phenome-
nal consciousness could possible “rise” from neural activity: if the
hypothesis is correct, then the phenomenal consciousness sim-
ply is a certain complex pattern of neural activity: a pattern of
patterns of patterns etc. of some simple neural events. It also
answers the question of why is there something “it is like to be”
conscious: if “qualia are simply those properties that character-
ize conscious states according to what it is like to have them,” as
Chalmers (2003, p. 135) puts it, then neuroscientiﬁcally intelligible
structural account of qualia is also neuroscientiﬁcally intelligible
structural account of why there is something it is like to be con-
scious. In other words, the question of why is there something it
is like to be conscious is, according to Chalmers, the question of
why qualia exist. And the main reason why we are scientiﬁcally
more puzzled by the existence of qualia than, for example, by the
existence of hydrogen atoms, chairs or neural processes, is that
in the case of the latter we could easily understand how they are
analyzable in fully structural terms (even though we might not
have such an analysis ready at hand), but in the case of qualia we
cannot. But once we succeed in analyzing qualia in fully structural
terms and identifying those structures with certain neural activity
patterns, the question of why qualia exist can be seen as a ques-
tion of why those neural activity patterns exist. And that question
could be, hopefully, eventually answered by the combined efforts
of neurobiology, evolutionary neuroscience, cognitive science and
possibly some other empirical disciplines.
And last but not least, the above structural account of con-
sciousness is psychologically convincing and intuitively illuminat-
ing: it is much easier to accept (for me, for Crick and Koch and,
hopefully, for many others) that the constitutive components of
qualia are unconscious associations, than, say, some fundamental
“protophenomenal” elements of whose nature we are completely
ignorant. Of course, it should be recognized that the view I have
proposed here is far from forced upon us by the evidence. Namely,
since we could, according to the hypothesis, actually never expe-
rience directly the full structure of any of our qualia, we could
also never establish the identify between qualia and certain neural
activity patterns with the same certainty we can establish identity
between themacro-physical quality of woodiness and somemicro-
physical properties of wood. Nevertheless, we could understand
how qualia could be identical with certain neural activity patterns
and how we could gather (both neurobiological and phenomenal)
evidence to support the idea of such identity.
SOME PHILOSOPHICAL CONSIDERATIONS
Finally, I would like to consider how the framework I have sug-
gested relates to some of the well-known arguments and thought
experiments used to illustrate the problematic hardness of the hard
problem. As mentioned earlier, the approach of Crick and Koch
is very naturalistic and rather unphilosophical. As Koch (2004, p.
316) himself puts it: “You can’t reason your way to an explanation
of consciousness. Brains are too complicated, and are conditioned
on toomany random events and accidents of evolutionary history,
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for such armchair methods to successfully illuminate the truth.”
Such empirical spirit should be seen as a particular strength of their
approach: it seems to bemuchmore preferable to come by with an
actual (even though hypothetical) scientiﬁc account of conscious-
ness and qualia than to simply demonstrate philosophically that
such scientiﬁc account could be developed. Should such scientiﬁc
account be successful, then thephilosophical arguments against (as
well as for) its possibility would lose most of their appeal. There-
fore I do not attempt to put forward any fully developed arguments
for the philosophical plausibility of the hypothesis of Crick and
Koch in this section, but merely to consider the possible nature of
the impact of their theory, should it be approximately true, to the
philosophical debate about the issue. Anyhow, since the theory of
Crick and Koch is, as far as I can tell, philosophically fully com-
patible with the introspective inaccuracy hypotheses, put forward
by Pereboom (2011), one can look for more detailed and technical
approach to the philosophical problems considered below from
his book.
It has been often argued that it is ideally positively conceivable
that a creature physically identical to some conscious human being
(for example to you or to me) could nevertheless lack qualia, in
other words, that it could be some sort of unconscious zombie.
Similarly, it has been claimed that it is ideally positively conceiv-
able that someone physically and functionally identical to you or
to me could have his or her qualia inverted: for example, in sit-
uations where I would experience the red quale, he or she would
experience the green quale and vice versa. Arguably, there would
be no way of telling if someone’s qualia are inverted, for there
would be no physical or functional signs of it. (It has been argued
that from the above described conceivability would follow many
important metaphysical facts, including the non-physical nature
of consciousness. Since I am denying the ideal positive conceiv-
ability of zombies and inverted qualia, I will not examine any of
such arguments here.)
It seems rather obvious that if qualia can be analyzed fully in
structural terms (as networks of unconscious associations) and
if the structures of qualia are implemented by some patterns of
neural activity, then any creature that is physically identical to a
conscious human being would also have the exact same qualia
as she does. Namely, it would be logically inconsistent to hold
that some fully structural phenomenon could be somehow differ-
ent or even absent in an occasion where its structure is present.
Therefore, a zombie would be no more conceivable than a phys-
ical object that has the exact molecular structure of wood, but
lacks nevertheless the physical quality of woodiness. Likewise, the
inverted qualia would be no more conceivable than a sound that
has the overtone structure of a guitar sound, but sounds neverthe-
less trumpetish. Shortly, zombies and inverted qualia would not
be ideally positively conceivable.
It has been also argued that there is an unbridgeable epistemic
gap between neural activity and qualia. From the existence of
such gap it has been inferred, among other things, that con-
sciousness cannot be fully analyzed in neural terms. It is often
claimed, by referring to the famous article of Nagel (1974), that
any amount of objective knowledge about, say, a bat’s brain can
never contain the knowledge of what is it like to be a bat (in
other words, what is the exact qualitative character of a bat’s
consciousness). Nagel (1974, p. 440) himself also claims that
“[t]he subjective character of the experience of a person deaf
and blind from birth is not accessible to me, for example, nor
presumably is mine to him.” Similarly, Jackson (1986) argues
(and many agree) that a person who spends all her life in a
black-and-white environment, even if she is a skilled and well
educated neuroscientist, could never know what is it like to see
red.
According to the framework I have suggested, based on the
neurobiological theory of Crick and Koch, the subjective and
qualitative characters of the consciousnesses of bats, blind per-
sons, persons raised in black-and-white environments etc. can be
all described in structural terms, even though the above creatures
themselves would fail to do so, as individuals, in respect to their
own consciousnesses. Therefore, in a sense, there truly is an epis-
temic gap, but it should not be thought of as a necessary gap in
our scientiﬁc knowledge, for it is always a gap in some particu-
lar cognitive system’s individual knowledge. In some cases we can
imagine how such gap could be bridged with the help of some
hypothetical futuristic technology. For example, if we could alter
in a proper way the neural structure of a blind person or a per-
son who is raised in a black-and-white environment, we could in
principle convey them the knowledge of what is it like so see or
what is it like to see red. However, the case of us not knowing
what is it like to be a bat seems to be difﬁcult because the cognitive
structures of bats and people are simply too different. Even if we
could turn a person’s neural structure into a neural structure of
a bat, we would have simply turned a human consciousness that
does not know what is it like to be a bat into a bat’s consciousness
that “knows” what is it like to be a bat. It seems that an idea of a
human consciousness that has a structure of a bat’s consciousness
is simply inconsistent because the identity of human conscious-
ness depends of its having a structure of human consciousness
(at least if we accept the fully structural account of consciousness
defended in this paper).
It has been also argued that there is a fundamental and irre-
ducible difference between objective and subjective knowledge
about consciousness. I hope that the above presented ideas help
also clarify the nature of that difference. Objective knowledge
about some individual consciousness can be presented in struc-
tural terms and it is in fact a knowledge about a certain structure.
In order to have such knowledge, one has to have access to all the
relevant elements of that structure (in other words, one has to
be related to that structure in a proper way). We may hope that
one day the entire structure of consciousness will be discovered
in some patterns of neural activity and that the community of
neuroscientists will then have a chance to study it. A signiﬁcant
work toward that goal is already made. There are several theories
besides the one of Crick and Koch, for example Varela (1999),
Baars (1988), Dehaene et al. (1998), Lamme (2010), O’Brien and
Opie (1999) and many others, that help us tracking and recogniz-
ing different structural features of consciousness in some neural
activity patterns.
In order to have a subjective knowledge about some individual
consciousness, on the other hand, one would have to be a cognitive
system that has certain substructure of that individual conscious-
ness. Subjective knowledge about certain consciousness is hence
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always a particular substructure of that very consciousness. We
may say that if objective knowledge is in some sense an abstract
phenomenon, then subjective knowledge is, according to the neu-
robiological view adopted in this paper, always some very concrete
neural structure located in someone’s brain.We could in principle
analyze and describe whichever individual instance of a certain
subjective knowledge in perfectly objective and structural terms,
but in order to actually have that subjective knowledge, we would
have to, so to speak, turn a substructure of our own conscious-
ness into the structure of that knowledge. So, the two concepts
of knowledge, the objective and the subjective, are indeed differ-
ent, and even a perfect objective epistemic access to the structure
of a certain consciousness would not guarantee us the subjec-
tive knowledge about that consciousness. However, according to
the framework presented here, this purely conceptual distinction
does not imply any metaphysical distinctions or any philosoph-
ically problematic epistemic distinctions. Namely, it is easy to
understand and accept that having knowledge about some neu-
ral structure does not necessarily make that structure occur in
one’s brains.
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